Polling as Pedagogy: Experimental Philosophy as a Valuable Tool for Teaching Philosophy by Nadelhoffer, Thomas & Nahmias, Eddy
© Teaching Philosophy, 2008. All rights reserved. 0145-5788 pp. 39–58
 Teaching Philosophy, 31:1, March 2008 39
Polling as Pedagogy: Experimental Philosophy 
as a Valuable Tool for Teaching Philosophy
THOMAS NADELHOFFER
Dickinson College
EDDY NAHMIAS
Georgia State University
Abstract: First, we briefly familiarize the reader with the emerging field of 
“experimental philosophy,” in which philosophers use empirical methods, 
rather than armchair speculation, to ascertain laypersons’ intuitions about 
philosophical issues. Second, we discuss how the surveys used by experi-
mental philosophers can serve as valuable pedagogical tools for teaching 
philosophy—independently of whether one believes surveying laypersons is 
an illuminating approach to doing philosophy. Giving students surveys that 
contain questions and thought experiments from philosophical debates gets 
them to actively engage with the material and paves the way for more fruitful 
and impassioned classroom discussion. We offer some suggestions for how 
to use surveys in the classroom and provide an appendix that contains some 
examples of scenarios teachers could use in their courses.
When teaching philosophy, we often begin discussions by asking our stu-
dents some question, like, “Do you think we have free will if God already 
knows everything we will choose?” or by describing thought experiments, 
like zombies (creatures physically identical to us with no conscious experi-
ences) and asking if they are possible or impossible. We may then ask for 
a show of hands, perhaps calling on a few students to explain why they 
“voted” as they did in order to get the philosophical discussion started. 
We informally poll our students in this way in order to get them to think 
about the issues, to demonstrate the conflicting intuitions that motivate 
competing philosophical positions, and to get them interested and engaged 
in the philosophical debate. In this article, we suggest that this pedagogical 
technique of polling our students is a valuable one—so valuable that it 
should be used more often and in a more rigorous way. Let us explain.
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There is growing interest among philosophers working under the 
rubric of “experimental philosophy” in the intuitions and beliefs of 
laypersons. Researchers working in this nascent field have begun ex-
amining “folk” intuitions and conceptual usage concerning a myriad 
of philosophical problems in areas as diverse as epistemology (Nich-
ols, Stich, and Weinberg 2003), ethics (Nichols 2004a, 2004c), free 
will (Nahmias et al. 2005, 2006; Nichols 2004b; Nichols and Knobe 
2007), the philosophy of language (Machery et al. 2004), action theory 
(Knobe 2003, 2004; Nadelhoffer 2004, 2005), and the philosophy of law 
(Nadelhoffer 2006). One of the goals of experimental philosophy is to 
use controlled and systematic methods rather than armchair speculation 
to determine where people’s ordinary intuitions about philosophical 
problems lie—if they ordinarily lie anywhere at all.1 After all, phi-
losophers frequently appeal to common sense, intuitions, and ordinary 
conceptual usage. Determining precisely what the facts are about these 
things ought to be at least in part an empirical investigation.
In this paper, we first briefly familiarize the reader with some of 
the interesting and surprising findings of experimental philosophy—fo-
cusing primarily on recent research on folk intuitions concerning free 
will and moral responsibility. Second, we discuss how the kind of 
surveys used by experimental philosophers can serve as a valuable 
pedagogical tool for teaching philosophy—independently of whether 
one believes surveying laypersons is an illuminating approach to doing 
philosophy. Giving students surveys that contain questions and thought 
experiments from philosophical debates gets them to actively engage 
with the material and paves the way for more fruitful and impassioned 
classroom discussion. We also offer some suggestions concerning how 
to use surveys in the classroom and we provide an appendix that con-
tains some additional examples of scenarios that teachers could use 
in the classroom.2
Conceptual Analysis and Folk Intuitions
Ever since Socrates began challenging the beliefs and assumptions of 
his fellow Athenians—often much to their chagrin—philosophers have 
been in the business of analyzing concepts. One of Socrates’ motivat-
ing assumptions was that we should seek to find necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions for the correct application of the general terms 
that we use in ordinary language. This is an assumption that is still op-
erative among many analytic philosophers today. Indeed, for a number 
of contemporary philosophers, the method of doing philosophy is still 
broadly Socratic. When engaged in conceptual analysis, philosophers 
first pick a particular concept to investigate. Then, they put forward 
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tentative definitions and determine whether these definitions fall prey 
to counter-examples or involve any hidden internal inconsistencies.
Given this view of conceptual analysis, intuitions about particular 
cases often take center stage in contemporary philosophy.3 But to the 
extent that intuitions play a central role in conceptual analysis, it seems 
reasonable to ask whose intuitions philosophers ought to count.4 While 
some philosophers may refer only to the tutored intuitions of philoso-
phers, many refer instead to the pre-theoretical intuitions of laypersons. 
On this latter view, ordinary concepts and folk intuitions are the proper 
subject matter of conceptual analysis, and they are meant to offer prima 
facie support for or evidence against a philosophical theory.
This seems to be the approach to conceptual analysis adopted by 
Socrates himself. After all, in asking his interlocutors to answer ques-
tions such as “What is courage?” or “What is knowledge?” he was 
trying to force them to give an account of their own ordinary concepts 
and not some technical or philosophical counterparts. Moreover, the 
effectiveness of the Socratic method depended on the interlocutors’ 
own intuitions about the counter-examples that Socrates put forward. In 
this respect, the philosophical appeal to intuitions has often—although 
admittedly not always—been fueled by an interest in folk judgments 
concerning particular cases. Similarly, when we teach philosophy we 
also use the Socratic method to probe our students’ intuitions and to 
prompt them to come with up justifications for these intuitions.
Recently, philosophers have begun to recognize the importance of 
trying to get at folk intuitions in a more rigorous way than simply ask-
ing students for an informal show of hands. Working at the crossroads 
of philosophy and the social sciences, experimental philosophers have 
begun borrowing methods from psychology to formally probe folk intu-
itions with the goal of shedding light on philosophical debates that are 
mired in intuitional conflict. Of course, experimental philosophers do 
not suggest that discovering what people’s intuitions actually are will 
solve any philosophical problems. Nor do they suggest that ordinary 
language or pre-theoretical judgments should serve as the final court 
of appeal in philosophical debates. The goal of experimental philoso-
phers is more modest.
Researchers first and foremost want to get at the relevant folk con-
cepts and intuitions in a controlled and systematic rather than merely 
speculative manner. Presumably, once we know what the pre-theoretical 
intuitions about a particular philosophical problem are, philosophers 
will no longer be able to claim that their position aligns with common 
sense unless their views empirically merit such support. In the event 
that a particular analysis of an ordinary concept does turn out to settle 
with folk intuitions that alone would not prove it to be true, but it 
would seem to shift the argumentative burden to those philosophical 
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theories or analyses that have counterintuitive implications. And if 
ordinary intuitions are hopelessly inconsistent or subject to irrelevant 
biases, then philosophers should be wary about using them as evidence 
for philosophical claims.5
For present purposes, we are going to set aside the question of 
whether experimental philosophy is a fruitful way of doing philosophy, 
since adequately answering this question would take us too far afield.6 
We are going to focus instead on the value of using systematic surveys 
for teaching philosophy. In our experience, polling students is not only 
an excellent way of getting them to engage with the material, it is also 
an excellent way of getting them to actively participate in class dis-
cussion. Moreover, by taking the time and energy to learn more about 
a particular group of students’ intuitions concerning philosophical 
problems, we place ourselves in a better position as teachers to help 
students gain a perspicuous view of the relevant issues involved.
Folk Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility
Perhaps the best way to begin would be to consider examples of surveys 
that experimental philosophers have relied on in their efforts to probe 
folk intuitions. One area that has received a lot of attention recently 
is the free will debate. Incompatibilists often claim that their view 
is intuitive and that compatibilism is counterintuitive; for instance, 
Robert Kane writes, “In my experience, most ordinary persons start 
out as natural incompatibilists. . . . Ordinary persons have to be talked 
out of this natural incompatibilism by the clever arguments of philoso-
phers” (Kane 1999: 217). And incompatibilists sometimes suggest that 
informal polls of their students provide evidence for this claim. For 
instance, Derk Pereboom claims that “[b]eginning students typically 
recoil at the compatibilist response to the problem of moral respon-
sibility” (Pereboom 2001: xvi), and Timothy O’Connor writes, “Does 
freedom of choice have this implication [that causal determinism is 
false]? It seems so to the typical undergraduate on first encountering 
the question” (O’Connor 2000: 4).
As we’ve said, we support polling students, but it is important to 
do so in a systematic way, since it is easy to present philosophical 
problems in ways that will adduce particular answers. Indeed, we have 
our own unscientific “evidence” indicating that a compatibilist teacher 
can present the issue so that most students do not see a problem with 
determinism and raise their hands in support of a compatibilist con-
ception of free will. So it is important to present the issues without 
using cases that would beg significant questions (e.g., by presenting 
determinism as equivalent to fatalism or manipulation by the forces 
of nature) and, if done in the classroom, without students knowing the 
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position held by the teacher. Of course, in the literature, philosophical 
thought experiments are often designed as rhetorical devices, aiming 
precisely to pump intuitions in specific ways, rather than as neutral 
probes of pre-philosophical intuitions. In such cases, teachers can use 
such intuition pumps to discuss with their students the features of the 
cases that do the rhetorical work. However, in order to probe students’ 
pre-philosophical intuitions effectively, the cases should contain as few 
philosophically irrelevant features as possible and be pitched at a level 
students can understand.
In a series of recent papers, we discuss the results of several studies 
we ran that examined folk intuitions concerning free will, determinism, 
and moral responsibility, studies in which we attempted to present the 
issues in a neutral way.7 Participants were students at Florida State 
University who had not studied the free will debate. They were asked 
to read a scenario and answer the questions that followed, and they 
were told there were no right or wrong answers. In one study students 
received the following vignette:
Imagine that in the next century we discover all the laws of nature, and we 
build a supercomputer that can deduce from these laws of nature and from 
the current state of everything in the world exactly what will be happening 
in the world at any future time. It can look at everything about the way the 
world is and predict everything about how it will be with 100 percent ac-
curacy. Suppose that such a supercomputer existed, and it looks at the state 
of the universe at a certain time on March 25, 2150, twenty years before 
Jeremy Hall is born. The computer then deduces from this information and 
the laws of nature that Jeremy will definitely rob Fidelity Bank at 6:00 p.m. 
on January 26, 2195. As always, the supercomputer’s prediction is correct; 
Jeremy robs Fidelity Bank at 6:00 p.m. on January 26, 2195.
2150 2170 2195
 Computer Jeremy Jeremy
 makes is born robs bank
 prediction
Some students were asked whether they believed that in robbing the 
bank Jeremy acted “of his own free will,” and others were asked instead 
whether Jeremy was morally responsible for robbing the bank.8 The 
results indicate that a significant majority of students (76 percent) who 
received the first question judged that Jeremy robs the bank of his own 
free will, and 83 percent of the students who received the second question 
judged that Jeremy was blameworthy for robbing the bank. Scenarios that 
had Jeremy performing positive actions (saving a child from a burning 
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building) and neutral actions (going jogging) produced similar results. 
On the surface at least, it appears that people are pre-theoretically less 
incompatibilist than philosophers have traditionally assumed.
One might object that in the Jeremy cases, we did not make the 
deterministic nature of the scenario salient enough to the participants. 
Perhaps they were more focused on the fact that Jeremy’s actions were 
predicted by the supercomputer than the fact that the prediction was 
made based on deterministic laws. To explore this possibility, we de-
veloped another scenario that presents determinism in a different and 
more salient way by highlighting that the agents’ behavior is sufficiently 
caused by factors beyond their control (i.e., genes and upbringing):
Imagine there is a world where the beliefs and values of every person are 
caused completely by the combination of one’s genes and one’s environment. 
For instance, one day in this world, two identical twins, named Fred and 
Barney, are born to a mother who puts them up for adoption. Fred is adopted 
by the Jerksons and Barney is adopted by the Kindersons. In Fred’s case, his 
genes and his upbringing by the selfish Jerkson family have caused him to 
value money above all else and to believe it is OK to acquire money however 
you can. In Barney’s case, his (identical) genes and his upbringing by the 
kindly Kinderson family have caused him to value honesty above all else and 
to believe one should always respect others’ property. Both Fred and Barney 
are intelligent individuals who are capable of deliberating about what they do. 
One day Fred and Barney each happen to find a wallet containing $1000 and 
the identification of the owner (neither man knows the owner). Each man is 
sure there is nobody else around. After deliberation, Fred Jerkson, because of 
his beliefs and values, keeps the money. After deliberation, Barney Kinderson, 
because of his beliefs and values, returns the wallet to its owner. Given that, in 
this world, one’s genes and environment completely cause one’s beliefs and 
values, it is true that if Fred had been adopted by the Kindersons, he would 
have had the beliefs and values that would have caused him to return the wal-
let; and if Barney had been adopted by the Jerksons, he would have had the 
beliefs and values that would have caused him to keep the wallet.
Despite what we took to be a robust description of complete causa-
tion by genes and environment, a significant majority of students (76 
percent) judged both that Fred kept the wallet of his own free will 
and Barney returned it of his own free will. This response pattern was 
very similar to the pattern of students’ judgments about free will in the 
Jeremy cases, suggesting that this scenario probed similar intuitions 
about the relationship between determinism and free will. We also tested 
whether students judge that Fred is “morally blameworthy for keeping 
the wallet” and that Barney is “morally praiseworthy for returning the 
wallet.” For almost all students, these judgments were consistent, and 
the response patterns were not significantly different from the judg-
ments we collected about free will: 60 percent judged that Fred is 
blameworthy and 64 percent judged that Barney is praiseworthy.
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Finally, we ran a third survey in which we described determinism 
in terms of a universe being re-created over and over such that given 
the same initial conditions and laws of nature, everything must happen 
the same way every time, including an agent’s stealing a necklace at 
a particular time every time the universe is re-created. Most students 
(66 percent) judged that the agent acts of her own free will, and most 
(77 percent) judged her to be morally responsible for her action. These 
results are consistent with those in the other two cases. They are incon-
sistent, however, with the incompatibilist prediction that most people 
recognize that “there is some kind of conflict between freedom and 
determinism” (Kane 1999).
Indeed, since incompatibilism is usually touted as the intuitive and 
commonsensical view, it is surprising that so many students judged that 
agents in a deterministic universe acted freely and are morally respon-
sible for their actions. Not surprisingly, other experimental philosophers 
have developed studies to test whether there are alternative explanations 
to our data—for instance, whether there are conditions under which 
people are more likely to express incompatibilist intuitions (Nichols 
and Knobe 2007). This preliminary experimental work on free will and 
moral responsibility has generated an interesting discussion about how 
best to understand people’s pre-philosophical intuitions and judgments 
and also about how empirically informed data about such intuitions 
and judgments should be—or should not be—used in philosophical 
debates (Nadelhoffer and Nahmias 2007; Kauppinen 2007; Knobe and 
Doris forthcoming; Sosa 2007).
As we’ve mentioned, experimental philosophers are also polling 
students (and other folk) to better understand ordinary intuitions and 
conceptual usage regarding, among other topics, knowledge, intentional 
action, moral judgments, and reference. We will not review that work 
here, but in the Appendix we offer some examples of the thought ex-
periments used in some of these studies, along with references to some 
famous thought experiments in the literature, as a resource for those 
who are interested in using such surveys as a tool to teach philosophy. 
We will now explain in more detail why we think philosophy teachers 
will find polling their students in a systematic way to be a valuable 
tool and how we suggest teachers use it in the classroom.
Why Use Surveys in the Philosophy Classroom
We have found polling students to be an excellent example of good 
research going hand-in-hand with good teaching. During the course of 
running our studies on free will and determinism, we found that hand-
ing out surveys to students that probed their intuitions about thought 
experiments and philosophical problems not only generated some 
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interesting results, but it also worked remarkably well to get students 
to engage with the material. Whether we were lecturing about the 
Trolley Problem, Gettier cases, Frankfurt cases, Nozick’s experience 
machine, and the like (see Appendix), polling has proven to be a useful 
pedagogical tool. So we started handing out surveys to students even 
when the results would not be included in any formal studies. A tool 
that we originally introduced into our classrooms for research purposes 
turned out to be a valuable pedagogical tool as well.9
Of course, using thought experiments in philosophy classes is noth-
ing new—most of us do it all the time. So, why should we spend the 
extra time it takes to type up, copy, and hand out surveys to students 
when we can simply describe the thought experiment and poll them as 
a group? There are several benefits of using formal surveys as a way 
of introducing students to philosophical topics and issues.
1) Clear and fair presentation of the thought experiment. Many of 
the surveys you have students take will be based on thought experi-
ments they will encounter in the readings. By surveying students, not 
only do you familiarize them with some of the puzzles that interest 
philosophers, but you also help foster student engagement with the 
material—which we have found is perhaps the main pedagogical benefit 
of polling. Rather than talking through the thought experiments and 
hoping both that you present them accurately and that the students keep 
up with them and remember their important details, they can have a 
written version in front of them to read carefully and refer back to as 
needed. Students can reflect on the cases sufficiently to give thought-
ful responses to the questions that follow them. It can be useful to 
use the more rhetorical intuition pumps in the literature, since you 
will often assign the articles from which they derive to the students. 
And you can also discuss the thought experiment as a philosophical 
tool and ways to respond to this tool, including analysis of the subtly 
misleading—or at least leading—elements of the intuition pump. But 
it can also be useful to use the scenarios developed by experimental 
philosophers (see Appendix), since these are generally designed both 
to be clear and understandable by laypersons and also to offer a fair 
presentation of the issues. Of course, you can also develop your own 
version of the thought experiments! (See note 2 for references to col-
lections of thought experiments.)
2) Clear and accurate presentation of the polling results. When phi-
losophy teachers poll their students, they usually have them raise their 
hands and take a quick tally of the results, “guesstimating” in terms 
of rough proportions—“OK, it looks like we have one quarter who are 
consistent utilitarians and three quarters who are utilitarians unless they 
have to push the fat man to his death to stop the runaway trolley.” It 
is more useful to tabulate their responses more accurately and present 
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them clearly on the board for students to see. They will often be quite 
surprised to see how many students do not share their own intuitions, 
and this will help spark discussion, with the students realizing they need 
to come up with some justifications for their own beliefs regarding the 
cases since their beliefs are not shared by many other students.
3) Suggests to students that their opinions are important. Having 
students participate in a class survey is a nice way of showing them that 
their opinions are interesting and important enough for philosophers to 
pay attention to—even if the results of the poll are not going to end 
up being part of any formal studies. As a result, we have found that 
students end up being more likely to carefully read the vignettes and 
respond to the questions. By giving them five minutes at the beginning 
of class to quietly reflect on a philosophical puzzle, you give students 
the chance to do what we philosophers do all the time. Indeed, we 
have been surprised by how many students took the time to carefully 
explain their answers to the survey questions.
4) Initiates discussion and debate. If you simply ask students out 
loud what they think about a thought experiment, they have far less 
time to think about the problem. As a result, fewer students will be 
comfortable explaining their answers in front of their classmates. If 
you give them a few minutes to quietly puzzle over a philosophical 
problem, on the other hand, you make it more likely that they will 
commit to a particular answer or position and feel more comfortable 
discussing their views since they have had some time to flesh out 
their ideas and intuitions. Students who feel more strongly about a 
philosophical problem are more likely to participate in class discus-
sions about that problem—especially once students are informally 
divided into “yes” and “no” groups (you can also divide them more 
formally, putting them on opposite sides of the classroom to debate 
the topic). Moreover, students with similar intuitions are more likely 
to support one another’s arguments and suggestions, thereby further 
increasing the willingness of others to participate. In our experience, 
surveying students increases how invested they end up feeling about 
a philosophical topic or problem. Finally, we always have students 
write out on the back of the surveys their explanations for why they 
made the judgments they did. This leads them to begin to try to find 
justifications for their philosophical intuitions. The subtle difference 
between writing down one’s opinion and why one holds it, rather than 
just considering one’s answer and raising one’s hand, can also change 
how invested the students feel about their views.
5) Allows you to get to know your students and allows them to get 
to know each other. Another benefit of using formal surveys in the 
classroom is that doing so affords the teacher an opportunity to get 
a more accurate feel for how a particular group of students responds 
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to particular thought experiments. Knowing in advance where your 
students are in terms of their attitudes and judgments concerning a 
philosophical issue enables you to focus more on things you know 
many of them find to be counter-intuitive. Not only does surveying 
students provide teachers with more insight into their students’ beliefs 
and judgments, it also gives teachers the chance to see whether their 
students’ intuitions about a particular issue change during the course 
of the class.10 For instance, if students initially have consequentialist or 
naïve relativist intuitions, how likely is it that they will be persuaded 
by Kant’s arguments? What about thought experiments that purport-
edly show rather than say what’s wrong with consequentialism or 
naïve relativism? Do students find these intuition pumps to be more 
persuasive than the lengthy philosophical arguments that contain them? 
If so, that would be a curious and important thing to know. This rep-
resents yet another way in which surveying students produces positive 
pedagogical side effects.
Formally surveying students and having them express their responses 
also allows them to get to know what their peers think about the is-
sues. Finally, teachers can also let their students know what they think. 
Though there are important issues about neutrality vs. advocacy to 
consider (see, e.g., Bomstad 1995), in some cases teachers may decide 
to explain why they answer the survey questions in a particular way. 
And they may explain why they initially had certain intuitions about 
cases but, through reflective equilibrium or theorizing, came to view 
those intuitions as mistaken.
How to Use Surveys in the Classroom
• Pass the surveys out before any discussion or reading on the topic (it is 
often best to hand them out at the beginning of class11 but sometimes 
good to have them do them at end of class or as homework to think about 
before next class, or before they do the relevant reading).
• With larger classes you can have students help you pass the surveys out, 
take them up, and quickly tally the results.
• We usually write at the top of the survey something like, “Please read the 
scenario below carefully. Then answer the questions that follow. There 
are no right or wrong answers. I am interested in finding out what your 
intuitions about the scenario are.”
• It is crucial to use scenarios that are clear and understandable to the 
students. This means that you sometimes need to modify ones that are 
used in the philosophical literature. Try to avoid any technical language 
or philosophical terms of art. You may sometimes want to use slightly 
different versions of scenarios with different students to see what effects 
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the differences have (e.g., the bystander at the switch and footbridge 
versions of the trolley problem). Occasionally it can be useful to have 
students answer questions to a series of related scenarios.
• Just after the scenario, if appropriate, you may want to include a reminder 
to think conditionally or counterfactually (e.g., “please answer the follow-
ing questions on the assumption that the scenario is true,” “even if you 
think this scenario is implausible, imagine it is the case as you answer 
the following questions”). This also opens an opportunity to discuss 
conditional and counterfactual reasoning with the students (see note 8).
• For the questions, it’s usually best to use “yes,” “no,” and “I don’t know” 
as the possible answers but you can also use a Likert scale (e.g., “to what 
degree do you agree or disagree” with a -3 to +3 scale). It’s usually best not 
to use too many questions. It can be interesting to have different students 
answer different questions about the same scenario to find correlations 
and conflicts.
• Finally, on the back of the survey (and only after they have answered all 
the questions) you should have students write a short explanation of why 
they answered the questions as they did. As discussed above, this will get 
them thinking more deeply about their reasons for having the intuitions 
they have and make them more comfortable expressing their opinion if 
you ask for volunteers or call on them. And it will also allow you to get 
a better sense of your students’ thoughts on the issues you are teaching.
• Again, put the results on the board. They will almost never be unanimous. 
If they are closely split, you can have the students debate. If the results 
are lop-sided, the majority is usually very interested to hear how the 
minority could possibly think the crazy things they do. And members of 
the minority are often happy to oblige.
Conclusion
Experimental philosophy represents an interesting—and we believe 
productive—new methodology in academic philosophy. Even if it 
turns out to be less important for research than many experimental 
philosophers have assumed, the formal survey methodology it employs 
will remain a valuable tool for teaching philosophy for the reasons we 
have discussed in this paper. We firmly believe that surveying students 
is one of the easiest and most effective ways to get one’s students to 
start actively philosophizing rather than merely passively learning phi-
losophy. Minimally, by giving students surveys that afford them with 
the opportunity to quietly flesh out the details of philosophical thought 
experiments and then having them discuss these experiments with one 
another in class, we make it more likely that they will engage in the 
kind of Socratic dialogue that is the lifeblood of philosophy.
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Appendix: Some Examples of Scenarios for Surveying Students
• The Knobe Effect (Knobe 2003) regarding Intentional Action (different sub-
jects get different scenarios with one of the two words in the brackets):
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board 
and said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us 
increase profits, but it will also [harm, help] the environment.’ The 
chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about [harming, 
helping] the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. 
Let’s start the new program.’ They started the new program. Sure 
enough, the environment was [harmed, helped].
Question: Did the chairman intentionally [harm, help] the environ-
ment?
(Knobe and others have found that a robust majority responds that 
he did intentionally harm the environment while a robust majority 
responds that he did not intentionally help the environment.)
• The Butler Problem (1977)—Similar scenario used in Nadelhoffer 
2004:
If Brown in an ordinary game of dice hopes to throw a six and 
does so, we do not say that he threw the six intentionally. On the 
other hand if Brown puts one cartridge into a six-chambered revolver, 
spins the chamber as he aims it at Smith and pulls the trigger hoping 
to kill Smith, we would say if he succeeded that he had killed Smith 
intentionally. How can this be so, since the probability of the desired 
result is the same?
• Gettier Cases (Gettier 1963)—Scenarios used in Nichols, Stich, and 
Weinberg 2003:
Case 1: Bob has a friend, Jill, who has driven a Buick for many 
years. Bob therefore thinks that Jill drives an American car. He is not 
aware, however, that her Buick has recently been stolen, and he is also 
not aware that Jill has replaced it with a Pontiac, which is a different 
kind of American car.
Question: Does Bob really know that Jill drives an American car, 
or does he only believe it?
Case 2: Pat is at the zoo with his son, and when they come to the 
zebra cage, Pat points to the animal and says, “that’s a zebra.” Pat is 
right—it is a zebra. However, given the distance the spectators are 
from the cage, Pat would not be able to tell the difference between a 
real zebra and a mule that is cleverly disguised to look like a zebra. 
And if the animal had really been a cleverly disguised mule, Pat still 
would have thought that it was a zebra.
Question: Does Pat really know that the animal is a zebra, or does 
he only believe that it is?
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• Brain-in-a-Vat Scenario—Scenario used in Nichols et al. 2003:
Scenario: George and Omar are roommates, and enjoy having late-
night ‘philosophical’ discussions. One such night Omar argues, “At 
some point in time, by, like, the year 2300, the medical and computer 
sciences will be able to simulate the real world very convincingly. 
They will be able to grow a brain without a body, and hook it up to a 
supercomputer in just the right way so that the brain has experiences 
exactly as if it were a real person walking around in a real world, talk-
ing to other people, and so on. And so the brain would believe it was 
a real person walking around in a real world, etc., except that it would 
be wrong—it’s just stuck in a virtual world, with no actual legs to walk 
and with no other actual people to talk to. And here’s the thing: how 
could you ever tell that it isn’t really the year 2300 now, and that you’re 
not really a virtual-reality brain? If you were a virtual-reality brain, 
after all, everything would look and feel exactly the same to you as it 
does now!” George thinks for a minute, and then replies: “But, look, 
here are my legs.” He points down to his legs. “If I were a virtual-
reality brain, I wouldn’t have any legs really—I’d only really be just 
a disembodied brain. But I know I have legs—just look at them!—so 
I must be a real person, and not a virtual-reality brain, because only 
real people have real legs. So I’ll continue to believe that I’m not a 
virtual-reality brain.” George and Omar are actually real humans in 
the actual real world today, and so neither of them are virtual-reality 
brains, which means that George’s belief is true.
Question: Does George know that he is not a virtual-reality brain, 
or does he only believe it?
• Robert Nozick’s Experience Machine (Nozick 1974):
Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you 
any experience you desired. Super-duper neuropsychologists could 
stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing 
a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All 
the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to 
your brain. Should you plug into this machine for life, preprogramming 
your life’s desires? Of course, while in the tank you won’t know that 
you’re there; you’ll think it’s all actually happening. Others can also 
plug in to have the experiences they want, so there’s no need to stay 
unplugged to serve them (ignore problems such as who will service 
the machines if everyone plugs in).
Question: Would you plug in?
• Bernard Williams’s Jim and the Indians (Williams 1973):
Jim finds himself in the central square of a small South American 
town. Tied up against the wall are a row of twenty Indians, most ter-
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rified, a few defiant, in front of them several armed men in uniform. 
A heavy man . . . turns out to be the captain in charge and, after a 
good deal of questioning of Jim which established that he got there 
by accident while on a botanical expedition, explains that the Indians 
are a random group of the inhabitants who, after recent acts of protest 
against the government, are just about to be killed to remind other pos-
sible protestors of the advantages of not protesting. However, since Jim 
is an honored visitor from another land, the captain is happy to offer 
him a guest’s privilege of killing one of the Indians himself. If Jim 
accepts, then as a special mark of the occasion, the other Indians will 
be let off. Of course, if Jim refuses, then there is no special occasion, 
and Pedro here will do what he was about to do when Jim arrived, 
and kill them all.
Question: Should Jim kill one Indian to spare the lives of nineteen 
others?
• Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Trolley Problem (1985)—Similar scenario used 
in Greene et al. 2001:
Suppose you are the driver of a trolley. The trolley rounds a bend, 
and there comes into view ahead five track workmen, who have been 
repairing the track. The track goes through a bit of a valley at that 
point, and the sides are steep, so you must stop the trolley if you are 
to avoid running the five men down. You step on the brakes, but, alas, 
they don’t work. Now you suddenly see a spur of track leading off to 
the right. You can turn the trolley onto it, and thus save the five men 
on the straight track ahead. Unfortunately, Mrs. Foot has arranged that 
there is one track workman on that spur of track. He can no more get 
off the track in time than the five can, so you will kill him if you turn 
the trolley onto the spur.
Question: Is it morally permissible for you to turn the trolley?
• Thomson’s Society of Music Lovers (Thomson 1971):
Imagine this. You wake up and find yourself back to back in bed with 
an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been 
found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers 
has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone 
have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and 
last night the violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so 
that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well 
as your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, “Look, we’re 
sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you . . . but still, they did 
it, and the violinist is now plugged into you. To unplug you would be to 
kill him. But never mind, it’s only for nine months. By then he will have 
recovered from his ailment, and can be safely unplugged from you.
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Question: Is it morally permissible for you to simply unplug yourself 
from the violinist right away?
• Locke’s Locked Room (Locke 1991):
Suppose a man is carried, while fast asleep, into a room, where 
there is a person he longs to see and speak with: and suppose he is 
locked in the room, beyond his power to get out: he awakes, and is 
glad to find himself in so desirable company, which he stays willingly 
in, i.e., prefers his stay to going away.
Questions: Does the man stay in the room (a) voluntarily, and (b) 
freely?
• Frankfurt’s Nefarious Surgeon (Frankfurt 1969)—Related scenarios used 
in Woolfolk, Doris, and Darley 2006:
Suppose someone—Black, say—wants Jones to perform a certain 
action. Black is prepared to go to considerable length to get his way, 
but he prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits 
until it is clear to him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) that 
Jones is going to decide to do something other than what he wants 
him to do. Whatever Jones’s initial preferences and inclinations then, 
Black will have his way. . . . Now suppose Black never had to show 
his hand because Jones, for reasons of his own, decides to perform and 
does perform the very action Black wants him to perform.
Questions: Is Jones responsible for performing the action in ques-
tion even though he could not have avoided performing it? Does Jones 
freely perform the action even though he could not have avoided 
performing it?
• Lehrer’s Truetemp Case (Lehrer 1990)—Scenario used in Swain, Alex-
ander, and Weinberg 2006:
Suppose a person, whom we shall name Mr. Truetemp, undergoes 
brain surgery by an experimental surgeon who invents a small device 
which is both a very accurate thermometer and a computational device 
capable of generating thoughts. The device, call it a tempucomp, is 
implanted in Truetemp’s head so that the very tip of the device, no 
larger than the head of a pin, sits unnoticed on his scalp and acts as 
a sensor to transmit information about the temperature to the com-
putational system of his brain. This device, in turn, sends a message 
to his brain causing him to think of the temperature recorded by the 
external sensor. Assume that the tempucomp is very reliable, and so 
his thoughts are correct temperature thoughts. All told, this is a reliable 
belief-forming process. Now imagine, finally, that he has no idea that 
the tempucomp has been inserted in his brain, is only slightly puzzled 
about why he thinks so obsessively about the temperature, but never 
checks a thermometer to determine whether these thoughts about the 
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temperature are correct. He accepts them unreflectively, another effect 
of the tempucomp. Thus, he thinks and accepts that the temperature 
is 104 degrees. It is.
Question: Does he know that it is?
• Nichols’s Psychopathic Killer (Nichols 2004c):
John is a psychopathic criminal. He is an adult of normal intelli-
gence, but he has no emotional reaction to hurting other people. John 
has hurt and indeed killed other people when he has wanted to steal 
their money. He says that he knows that hurting others is wrong, but 
that he just doesn’t care if he does things that are wrong.
Question: Does John really understand that hurting others is mor-
ally wrong?
• Kripke (1972) cases of Reference—Scenario used in Machery et al. 
(2004):
Suppose that John has learned in college that Gödel is the man who 
proved an important mathematical theorem, called the incompleteness 
of arithmetic. John is quite good at mathematics and he can give an 
accurate statement of the incompleteness theorem, which he attributes 
to Gödel as the discoverer. But this is the only thing that he has heard 
about Gödel. Now suppose that Gödel was not the author of this theo-
rem. A man called “Schmidt,” whose body was found in Vienna under 
mysterious circumstances many years ago, actually did the work in 
question. His friend Gödel somehow got hold of the manuscript and 
claimed credit for the work, which was thereafter attributed to Gödel. 
Thus, he has been known as the man who proved the incompleteness 
of arithmetic. Most people who have heard the name “Gödel” are like 
John; the claim that Gödel discovered the incompleteness theorem is 
the only thing they have ever heard about Gödel.
Question: When John uses the name “Gödel,” is he talking about:
(A) the person who really discovered the incompleteness of arith-
metic? or
(B) the person who got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit 
for the work?
Notes
We would like to thank the experimental philosophers we have cited (and others we have 
not) for their interesting work and the surveys they have developed that we can use to 
teach our students. We especially thank Jason Turner and Steve Morris, our co-authors on 
our papers surveying folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility.
1. It could be that people don’t ordinarily have any beliefs or intuitions about some 
philosophical issues, such as mereology or set theory, but they are likely to have some 
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salient beliefs and intuitions about issues such as human knowledge, morality, intentional 
action, free will, moral responsibility, and legal culpability. 
2. Theodore Schick and Lewis Vaughn (2002) have put together an interesting text-
book that relies heavily on thought experiments as an effective way of teaching philosophy. 
The textbook—when combined with the formal surveying methods we discuss in this 
paper—would likely make for an effective way of getting students to learn philosophy. See 
also Tittle (2005) and Baggini (2005) for extensive collections of thought experiments.
3. Perhaps the best example of how conceptual analysis so conceived is supposed to 
work is the age-old definition of knowledge as justified true belief. According to Edmund 
Gettier, at least, this definition simply won’t do (Gettier 1963: 121–22), since he provides 
cases involving agents who seemingly have justified true beliefs that x, but who, intuitively, 
do not know that x. 
4. Determining precisely what intuitions are is a tricky matter that would take us too 
far afield for present purposes. For now, we are simply going to follow Alvin Goldman 
and Joel Pust in suggesting that, “the contents of intuitions are usually singular classifica-
tional propositions, to the effect that such-and-such an example is or is not an instance of 
knowledge, of justice, of personal identity, and so forth” (Goldman and Pust 1998: 182). 
So, students’ reflective responses to questions about well-constructed scenarios describing 
philosophical issues are generally a fair indication of their intuitions about those issues.
5. One natural response for philosophers whose positions do not settle with folk 
intuitions would be to explain why these intuitions are mistaken (i.e., offer an error 
theory) or why these folk concepts need to be revised. Alternatively, they might offer an 
explanation for why we have the intuitions we do but why they do not in fact commit 
us to certain conceptual or theoretical views. But these moves still require that we first 
determine—rather than merely speculate about—what these folk intuitions and concepts 
actually are. Otherwise, we will not know exactly what it is that needs to be explained away 
or revised. This suggests that we must first make an earnest attempt to probe and describe 
the folk intuitions in question before subsequent philosophical analyses are developed.
6. For an in depth examination of some of the meta-philosophical and methodological 
issues that arise in experimental philosophy see Kauppinen (2007) and Nadelhoffer and 
Nahmias (2007).
7. For details of the following studies, including more on methodology, statistics, 
and philosophical implications, see Nahmias et al. 2005 and 2006.
8. In pilot studies we found that some participants seemed to fail to reason conditionally 
(e.g., given their explanations on the back of the survey, some seemed to assume that the sce-
nario is impossible because Jeremy has free will, rather than making judgments about Jeremy’s 
freedom on the assumption that the scenario is actual). To correct for this problem, we used 
manipulation checks to determine comprehension and excluded participants who missed the 
checks, and we used an initial question which asked participants whether they think the scenario 
is possible (the majority responded ‘no,’ offering various reasons on the back of the survey). 
Then they were then asked to ‘suspend disbelief’ for the experimental question concerning 
whether Jeremy acted of his own free will, etc. Participants were specifically told that regardless 
of how they answered the question 1, they were to imagine that such a supercomputer actu-
ally did exist and actually could predict the future, including Jeremy’s robbing the bank (and 
they were told to assume that Jeremy does not know about the prediction). Whether people 
can really suspend belief in this way is both an interesting and open question. It also raises 
interesting issues about how to teach students to reason conditionally and counterfactually. 
9. Though experimental philosophers who plan to publish their data should get 
approval from their institution’s Human Subjects Committee (or IRB) to carry out such 
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research, using written surveys in the classroom for pedagogical purposes does not require 
such approval and does not appear to raise any special ethical concerns. 
10. Though you may want your students’ responses to remain anonymous (as ex-
perimental philosophers do in their formal surveys), you may sometimes want students 
to turn in their answers with their names. This seems unproblematic, since we often ask 
students to present and defend their opinions about philosophical issues.
11. We suggest handing out surveys in class, but another method that might be worth 
experimenting with is to post surveys online at your course website and have students take 
them for homework. There are several online survey programs (such as www.questionpro.
com and www.surveymonkey.com) that offer features such as tabulation and statistical 
analyses of results.
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